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Introduction
Because of the terrible things that governments do and the terrible
situations that governments neglect, friends of humanity seek improve-
ments in the political processes that currently produce decisions with
important, pervasive international consequences. This search for improve-
ment in global governance often leads to proposals of major reforms to
strengthen global institutions, i.e., multigovernmental institutions in which
all, or the vast majority, of the world's governments take part. Among aca-
demics in the United States, such proposals are especially attractive to lib-
eral theorists who are concerned with stark international inequalities of
power. They think that morally urgent global needs are ill-served by cur-
rent political processes in which, as Stanley Hoffmann sees it, "military
and economic giants will not be pushed around by hordes of pygmies,"' a
process which, in Robert Keohane's view, makes current "international
organizations... institutions of the privileged, by the privileged and all too
often for the privileged" 2 ; Richard Falk even goes so far as to warn that the
"unchallengeable military preeminence" of the United States is being
mobilized in "an emergent global fascism."
'3
The diagnosis condemns the cure, or so I will argue. Because of facts
of global power that stimulate proposals for large-scale reform of global
institutions, such advice is more likely than not to harm humanity, if it
makes any difference. The search for an institutional fix distracts from
f Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University.
1. Stanley Hoffmann, World Governance: Beyond Utopia, 132 DAEDALUS 27, 34
(2003).
2. Robert 0. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 95 AM. POL. Sci.
R. 1, 7 (2001).
3. RICHARD FALK, THE DECLINING WORLD ORDER: AMERICA'S IMPERIAL GEOPOLITICS
249 (2004).
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more productive thinking about the improvement of global governance-
above all, thinking about the global social movement that could help
humanity at our current stage. I will conclude by describing the special
promise of this non-institution and by suggesting how it might best
develop.
I. The Fatal Lure of the Institutional Fix
At the outset, the relevant sense of "institution" ought to be marked off
from the familiar usage in which it designates any social phenomenon
longer-lived than a fad-e-mail and happy hours as well as the modern state
and the Catholic Church. An institution, in this narrower sense, which
could be further specified as "organized institution," is a distinctively pow-
erful combination of four characteristics:
1. Authoritative rules. The participants jointly acknowledge the author-
ity of a current set of rules, to which they largely conform. This recognition
influences their conformity, partly because rule infraction is taken to be a
reason for condemning a participant as untrustworthy.
2. Procedures. These rules include a set of procedures for modifying,
further specifying, and implementing rules and identifying infractions.
3. Broad, normative scope. The rules have a fairly broad subject matter,
within which further modification and extension, via the shared proce-
dures, is regarded by participants as justifiable by shared norms. A failure
to seek justification on the basis of these norms makes a participant liable
to charges of lack of respect or integrity.
4. Enduring resources. At least in some reasonably extended period,
resources for engaging in all of these processes are reliably available, on a
basis that provides a reasonable expectation that the joint, rule-governed
process will continue into the indefinite future. (Once this period ends, the
institution is moribund or in peril.)
Social processes with these four features have special power, which
helps to explain their dominance of the market for proposals for improving
global governance. Shared acknowledgment of rules, treated as conditions
for trust, can give rise to conduct that becomes second nature, as partici-
pants pursue trustworthiness. As assets and human capital are created to
cope with rule-based expectations, further self-interested endeavors come
to be shaped by this new structure of resources. Institutions can respond to
new circumstances while continuing to rely on the same old basis for legiti-
macy. They can regulate large spheres of public life on the basis of corre-
spondingly large values. And their dedicated resources are a means of
fighting the great entropic forces of fatigue and distraction: in the modern
setting, this involves staffing, the funding of an organized group with the
job of ensuring continuity, possessing incentives and coordinative
resources adequate to this task.
Given the need to coordinate interactions among strangers, who often
(at least en masse) significantly affect others they never meet, institutions
are indispensable in the modern world. But if the task is improvement of a
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current sphere of social life already regulated by institutions, and if ine-
qualities of power are a main source of the harms to be mitigated, then it is
an open question whether new powers for institutions linking the strong
and weak are to be recommended. If the recommendations make any signif-
icant difference, the domineering influence of the top participants may
make the new institutional powers further tools for domination.
This is, in fact, the fate of proposals of major reforms meant to
strengthen global institutions. Global institutions currently make the diplo-
matic working-out of conflicts of interest more efficient; given the costs of
violence and disorder, no friend of humanity should wish that they would
disappear. But further, large-scale institutional changes that would chal-
lenge the domineering influence of great powers will not be adopted. If by
some fluke they were, effective diplomacy would desert these sites, a disas-
ter for the institutions and for world peace. On the other hand, if a large-
scale reform strengthening a global institution does not challenge the cur-
rent power structure, it is more likely than not to be hijacked by the global
elites whose dominance was supposed to be mitigated, making matters
worse for humanity. More localized institutions, which do not span such
great inequalities of power, and non-institutions, which are not susceptible
to overall control, are more effective means of relieving global burdens-
because of, not despite, the power of institutions to shape conduct.
II. Institutionalizing War against Injustice
One especially prominent theme of global institutional reform is the
proposal to institute a more permissive rule for intervention against grave
injustice, while investing special authority in the United Nations. This
change, advocated by Hoffmann and Falk, as well as Kofi Annan 4 , Antonio
Cassese 5 and many others, is a good illustration of the dangers of the insti-
tutional fix.
At present, there is no consensus among the world's governments that
ending a foreign injustice above the abysmal threshold of genocidal massa-
cre is a just cause of war. In the practice of diplomatic justification and
condemnation, a mishmash of precepts is available, some useful in defend-
ing the sovereign rights of tyrannies, some useful in claiming that these
rights have disappeared through grave abuse. The anti-interventionist for-
mulas increase the tendency for repeated intervention by a government to
generate distrust, while the interventionist formulas create some reason for
tyrants to worry about pushing oppression too far. The institutional
reformers would clean up some of this mess by instituting a rule that inter-
vention to end serious, systematic, and widespread violations of human
rights, contained with a regime's borders, is a just cause of war. At the
same time, a corresponding increase in the authority of the U.N. is sup-
posed to contain the dangers of the broader explicit license to make war;
4. See KOFI ANNAN, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION (1999).
5. See Antonio Cassese, Human Rights in a Changing World (1990).
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but it does not, because of the powers and interests of Hoffmann's "mili-
tary giants," above all, the brawniest giant.
The dangers of the broader license are very great. For one thing, a
great power engaged in humanitarian military intervention will use over-
whelming military superiority to reduce risks to its armed forces, even by
means that greatly increase morally relevant costs overall. Charles Maynes,
when he was editor of Foreign Policy, reported an exemplary consequence:
"CIA officials privately concede that the U.S. military may have killed from
7,000 to 10,000 Somalis during its engagement [in humanitarian interven-
tion] in Somalia. America lost only 34 soldiers.
' 6
Also, through selective implementation, the sole superpower would
use the broader license to intervene to extend and deepen its domineering
influence. In March 1999, the United States responded to brutal Serbian
repression of Kosovar Albanian aspirations to autonomy-repression which
had exacted a death toll in the vicinity of 2000, including both civilians
and KLA insurgents, over the previous year.7 The United States-initiated
bombing campaign fatally damaged the regime of a defiant, Russian-ori-
ented tyrant in the Balkans, and ended doubts about U.S. willingness to
put its armed might to violent use, post-Cold-War. In Turkey, in the fifteen
years prior to the bombing of Serbia, the death toll of a conflict over Kurd-
ish autonomy, characterized by widespread government brutality and sup-
pression of minimal expressions of Kurdish identity (including Kurdish
names and cassettes with Kurdish songs, much less Kurdish-language
schools), was over 20,000.8 Eighty percent of the armament used by Turk-
ish forces in their offensives against Kurdish villages was American, includ-
ing their most deadly apparatus, military helicopters with integrated air-to-
surface weapons. 9 In Afghanistan, Jimmy Carter's self-proclaimed human-
6. Charles W. Maynes, Relearning Intervention, 98 FOREIGN POL. 96, 98 (1995).
7. See INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT 2,
82f (2000).
8. In 1995, Human Rights Watch estimated that over 19,000 had been killed since
1984, singling out 2,000 killings by Turkish government death squads of suspected sym-
pathizers with the PKK, the Kurdish insurgent party, and noting that more than 2,200
Kurdish villages had been destroyed, most burned down by Turkish security forces. See
Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey (1995), available at
www.hrw.org. "Kurdish first names have been banned since the first decades of the
republic, with just one receiving official blessing in the 1990s.... The lifting in 1991 of
the official ban ... resulted in a brief spurt in sales of Kurdish music cassettes." NICOLE
POPE & HUGH POPE, TURKEY UNVEILED 256, 258 (1997). "Kurdish-language television
remains illegal. Schools and universities are still forbidden to offer instruction in Kurd-
ish, and academies where people may freely learn English, French, German and even
Japanese may not teach Kurdish." STEPHEN KINZER, CRESCENT AND STAR 132 (2001).
Nicole Pope and Kinzer were Istanbul correspondents for Le Monde and The New York
Times, respectively.
9. SeeJONATHON RANDAL, AFTER SUCH KNOWLEDGE, WHAT FORGIVENESS? 269 (1997);
Tamar Gabelnick, William D. Hartung & Jennifer Washburn, Arming Repression: U.S.
Arms Sales to Turkey during the Clinton Administration, Joint Report of World Policy Insti-
tute and Federation of American Scientists (1999), available at http://www.fas.org/
asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TURKEY: No SECURITY
WITHOUT HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (1996), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/
turkey/turktoc.htm.
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rights administration initiated U.S. sponsorship of fierce militias of fanati-
cal warlords countering repression by a Soviet-backed regime. During the
same administration, about 200,000 died, the vast majority civilians, in
Indonesia's invasion and subjugation of East Timor. 10 U.S.-supplied
counterinsurgency aircraft used to force villagers to leave the highlands
were a crucial and very lethal means of conquest, by armed forces deriving
90% of their weapons from the United States.'1 The U.S. Ambassador to
the U.N. described in his memoirs how he was instructed to respond to
massacres by Indonesian forces in their initial takeover, an invasion that
had been reported to have already claimed 60,000 lives: "The Department
of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in
whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it
forward with no inconsiderable success."
12
The tendency of selective implementation, knocking out defiant
tyrants and displaying fearsome might while preserving repressive allies, is
to extend the domination that liberal reformers fear, exacerbating such
evils as the inequitable shaping of the framework for globalization. World
peace is threatened over the long haul, as rival powers, above all China,
become more deeply wary of America's use of military might to extend its
global reach.
Finally, the interests of a superpower, as perceived by its dominant
elites, can be expected to produce farmore devastation than reconstruction
in the humanitarian-intervention process as a whole. In the many cases in
which it is in the interest of the United States to move on after destruction,
move on it does. Norway has contributed about as much aid to Somalia as
the United States. 13 On the other hand, when the United States has a vital
interest in steering the political trajectory of a country, post-intervention,
this is apt to be much more disastrous than neglect. In Iraq, the humanita-
rian justification, always the most plausible, soon became the leading ratio-
nale pressed by defenders of the U.S.-led invasion. The reshaping of Iraq
has been driven by U.S. interests in maintaining the fearsomeness of U.S.
power, containing Iran's regional power, insuring U.S.-friendly auspices for
Iraqi oil production, and privatizing and opening the Iraqi economy. Inevi-
tably, an American military presence on Iraqi soil driven by these interests
has prompted a fierce insurgency, divisive U.S. tactics to contain Iraqi
opposition, and a terrible toll of violent disorder. In the first three years,
according to a careful study applying standard epidemiological techniques,
10. See JACOB BERCOVITCH & RICHARD JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A CHRONO-
LOGICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONFLICTS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 1945-1995 162F (1997);
JOHN LAFFIN, WAR ANNUAL 4, 77 (1994).
11. See WILLIAM HARTUNG, WORLD POLICY INSTITUTE, U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS TO INDONE-
SIA 1975-1997, available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/indo
arms.html.
12. PATRICK MOYNIHAN, A DANGEROUS PLACE 247 (1978).
13. Indeed, in 2001, Norway's net aid was $20.1 million, compared to $9.9 million
from the United States. In 2004, Norway gave $33.7 million, and the U.S., $31.9 million.
See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003 Table 6.11 (2003); WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2006 Table 6.12 (2006).
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this toll included excess Iraqi deaths on the order of half a million. 14
Of course, the new just cause for war is supposed to be proclaimed
along with further traditional requirements of proportionality and neces-
sity, which Conferences of Catholic Bishops, U.N. High-Level Panels, and
U.S. National Security Advisors endorse in very similar terms. But no one
seriously thinks that the proclamation of these irreducibly vague con-
straints, the implementation of which are unavoidably speculative and ad
hoc, is an adequate safeguard. Rather, liberal reformers think that the
broader license will serve humanity if the United Nations oversees its use.
But the U.N. as it is and might realistically be will not have effective author-
ity to block the United States in violently pursuing global interests it
regards as important, or in blocking other great powers in pursuit of
regional interests they hold dear.
In interventionist proposals with some chance of adoption, such as the
Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change, assertions of a duty to defer to exclusive U.N. authority are
scrupulously avoided, when U.N. authorization is favored. 15 Given the
influence of the sole superpower, the facilities of the U.N. will, then, on
balance, promote domineering and destructive use of the broader license
by the United States. It is easy to forget how close the Security Council
14. Gilbert Burnham et al., Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, 368 THE LANCET
1421-28 (2006). Their sample is sufficiently large to entail a 95% confidence interval of
between 392,979 and 942,636 excess deaths, i.e., it is 95% probable that the death tolls
they report in a genuinely random sample of their size would reflect an Iraqi total in this
range. The vast majority of the excess were violent deaths, steeply increasing over time.
Coalition forces were the largest known cause of violent death (31%). The interviewers
asked for death certificates in response to 87% of the reports of deaths, which were
presented for 92% of the reports. In the media, the most frequently cited figures con-
cerning Iraqi deaths are not estimates but tabulations by Iraq Body Count of reports of
violent deaths of civilians by at least two well-established sources, i.e., civilian deaths in
military actions, deaths from criminal violence in excess of what would be expected
from the (tiny) rate of such deaths under Saddam, and deaths from terrorist attacks.
Burnham et al. note that these reports involved from 43,491 to 88,283 deaths in the
period of their survey. They also note the severe incompleteness of such tabulations
(which Iraq Body Count has always emphasized), which generally provide a tenth or less
of the toll in well-grounded epidemiological surveys in areas of prolonged violent con-
flict. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, MINISTRY OF PLANNING & DEVELOP-
MENT CORPORATION, IRAQI LIVING CONDITIONS SURvEY 2004: ANALYTICAL REPORT (2005)
available at http://www.iq.undp.org/ILCS/overview.htm, an extensive, collaborative
study involving the UN Development Programme and the Iraqi Ministry of Planning &
Development Corporation. The study, which covered the first year after the invasion,
surveyed 21,688 households, approximately 140,000 people." Id. at Overview. "The sec-
tion non-maternal mortality excludes soldiers living on military bases and only includes
deaths in episodes of war, such as combat operations, shelling, and the detonation of
explosive devices." See id. at 53. Since interviewees were asked by representatives of the
Iraqi Ministry of Planning to name all victims, dead insurgents were, presumably,
undercounted. The ILCS estimates 24,000 deaths in episodes of war from the start of the
invasion until April/May 2004, about one year later. In both Iraq Body Count tabula-
tions and Burnham et al.'s survey, the toll has doubled each year since.
15. See The Secretary-General, A More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2,
2004).
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came to certifiying the invasion of Iraq, easier yet to ignore the leading role
of the U.N. in providing auspices and agents (such as the ubiquitous
Lakhdar Brahimi), increasing the international look of negotiations, elec-
tions and accords that advanced U.S. interests.
On the other hand, a reformist aspiration toward United Nations that
defies the interests of the great powers and asserts exclusive authority is a
prayer best left unanswered. The impotence of the defiance would shatter
whatever credibility the U.N. has, while the lack of adequate accommoda-
tions for the interests of great powers would lead them to take their real
business elsewhere.
III. The Institutional Framework of Globalization
The interventionist proposals would construct more permissive rules
of international conduct. It might seem more promising to contain the
excesses of domination through the institution of global rules meant to
constrain. General rules, applied and modified through set procedures
governed by broad norms, is the process that distinguishes institutions
from mere treaties. This is Robert Keohane's project of advancing liberal
values globally through "the legalization of rules."'16 The WTO-adminis-
tered trade and property rights regime is a nice illustration of what is
shaped by what when the legalization of rules, the explicit project of the
WTO, meets the realities of power. Because of the interests and threat-influ-
ence of the small elite of high-income countries, the reduction of even egre-
gious anomalies of relatively little interest, such as rich-country
agricultural subsidies, is nil or agonizing slow; the most important anoma-
lies, such as borders pried open to financial services, yet closed to labor,
are ignored; and explicit anomalous exceptions, such as the Multi-Fiber
Accord and subsequent restrictions on Chinese imports, are imposed. Yet,
the prevalence of general rules and a shared general goal of trade-liberaliza-
tion does have one important impact. One-sided legalization of rules
makes it much easier to corral uppity developing countries seeking to
evade the rigors of the sort of liberalization whose only clear beneficiaries
are the dominant global elites and allied elites in developing countries.
The rigors of this liberalization are due to a trade regime that is dis-
tinctly unfriendly to the diverse local deviations from free trade which were
part of every large national escape from poverty before the Washington
Consensus instituted stronger rules. 17 This might make it attractive to
institute strong global enforcement of rules of one other sort: rules that are
broad in scope but flexible in adjustment to the diverse needs of develop-
ing countries. But because of current realities of interpretation and enforce-
16. Keohane, supra note 2, at 11.
17. See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE AS IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY
MATTERED (2001) for a cogent account of these departures from free trade orthodoxy.
Development strategies in the great success stories in East Asia relied on measures, such
as export subsidies and strong protection of vulnerable economic sectors, that are illegal
under the WTO (paralleling earlier successful development strategies of the United
States, Germany, and Japan).
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ment, such proposals, if they are instituted, are apt to do more harm than
good.
The capacity of domineering powers to manipulate flexible institu-
tional provisions is the bane of linkages of trade rights and aid to broad
labor standards. Minimum-wage standards have to be responsive both to
diverse local requirements for avoiding destitution and to diverse legitimate
strategies for growing trade and investment. Even the global enforcement of
child and slave labor bans has to be sensitive to the very different capabili-
ties of states and their bureaucracies. The market access and aid that
would provide large incentives for compliance is at the disposal of the
United States, the EU and Japan, and Bretton-Woods institutions steered by
the U.S. There is no chance that the United States will allow these
resources to be deployed beyond its control, in enforced judgments that
threaten its advantages in economic exploitation or deferential alliance in
such countries as Haiti, Egypt, Nicaragua, or Saudi Arabia. The role of the
United States in shaping policy at the World Bank, the IMF, and in the
trade regime now administered by the WTO, American uses of regional free
trade pacts, and American allocations of foreign aid all provide plenty of
reasons to suppose that minimally acceptable control of a labor-standards
regime would make serious linkage of labor standards with access and aid
a stick to advance U.S. power. For example, it would be a useful device in
the deepening contest with China, home to 600 million people living below
the "$2.00 a day" poverty line.
Probably, proposals for broad institutionalized linkages will simply
come to nothing. Still, in addition to costs in wasted energy and distraction
from feasible goals, the interests of humanity may be ill-served by propos-
als whose attractiveness as live prospects depends on illusions about the
tendencies of U.S. foreign policy. For example, illusions about beneficence
in the use of American power can play a dangerous role in acceptance of
violent American intervention, in the hope that it will be steered toward
humane goals. I believe that these illusions have been extremely dangerous
in Americans' responses to the invasion of Iraq and the continuing U.S.
military presence.
IV. Plague and Hope
Here and in other territories for global institutional reform, current
prescriptions would worsen the epidemic of destructive dominance. Fur-
ther description and diagnosis support a different way of improving global
governance.
For the last half-century, the United States has preserved and
extended its global power at the cost of vast death and devastation in devel-
oping countries. This has not been an occasional outbreak of stupidity or
blinkered enthusiasm, but an enduring feature of U.S. foreign policy,
under Presidents of both parties and diverse temperaments. Indeed, the
most devastating intrusions have been bipartisan efforts of successive
administrations.
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In Afghanistan, Zbigniew Brezinzski told an interviewer, "aid to the
opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul" was approved by Jimmy
Carter in light of Brezinzski's opinion that "this aid was going to induce a
Soviet military intervention." "That secret operation," he boasted, "was an
excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan
trap and you want me to regret it?"' 8 The death toll from that trap was over
a million, mostly Afghan civilians, as the United States, in four successive
administrations, funneled arms and subsidies through Pakistan to rigidly
Islamic warlords, first to torment the Soviet bear, then to contain the influ-
ence of Iran. 19
In the first war against Iraq led by President Bush, whose statesman-
ship is now the subject of much nostalgic celebration, precision-guided
weapons destroyed the power stations on which refrigeration, water supply
and sewage treatment depend, and bombs destroyed the main Baghdad
sewage treatment plant.20 Planners of these attacks explained to a Washing-
ton Post reporter that they were a deliberate effort to strike "against 'all
those things that allow a nation to sustain itself.'.... [This was done] to let
people know, 'Get rid of this guy and we'll be more than happy to assist in
rebuilding. ' '2 1 The relay from a Republican to a Democratic administra-
tion was flawless. Because of the vigorous defense of the sanctions by the
Clinton administration, which made it impossible to restore sanitation and
health care in Iraq, the sanctions ultimately led to over one hundred thou-
sand excess deaths among Iraqi children under five. 2 2
18. For the whole interview, see How Jimmy Carter and I Started the Mujahideen,
COUNTERPUNCH, Oct. 8, 2001, available at www.counterpunch.org/brzezinski/html. This
interview originally appeared in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Jan. 15-21, 1998, at 76, but
not in the shorter edition sent to the United States. See JOHN COOLEY, UNHOLY WARS 19f
(2000).
19. Human Rights Watch estimates that 1.5 million had died by 2001. See "Fueling
Afghanistan's War," (December 15, 2000), available at www.hrw.org. For a detailed
chronicle of U.S. involvement, see generally COOLEY, supra note 18.
20. ANDREW COCKBURN & PATRICK COCKBURN, OUT OF THE ASHES 4, 131 (1999).
21. Descriptions of the objective by a senior airforce officer "who played a central
role in the air campaign but declined to be named" and an unnamed "Air Force planner,"
reported in Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq, WASH. POST, June 23,
1991, at Al. Gellman attributes similar characterizations of this goal of "long-term lever-
age," in less pithy formulations, to Colonel John A. Warden Ill, Deputy Director of Strat-
egy, Doctrine and Plans for the Air Force.
22. The 1999 UNICEF survey of childhood mortality in Iraq concluded that if the
19 8 0's trend of reduced under-five mortality had continued through the 1990's, there
would have been 500,000 fewer deaths than occurred from the start of the sanctions
through 1998. UNICEF, CHILD AND MATERNAL MORTALITY SURVEY 1999: PRELIMINARY
REPORT 12 (1999), available at http://www.childinfo.org/Other/raq-sa.pdf. In a recent
reanalysis, Ali, Black and Jones consider the conservative assumption that under-five
mortality rates would have remained the same in the absence of the sanctions and derive
an excess deaths estimate of 400,000 on this basis. See Mohamed Ali, John Blacker and
Gareth Jones, Annual Mortality Rates and Excess deaths of Children under Five in Iraq,
1991-98, 57 POPULATION STUDIES 217-26 (2003). In another widely cited study, Richard
Garfield defended 227,000 as the most likely estimate based on all available data, with
106,000 as the outcome of quite conservative assumptions. See RICHARD GARFIELD, Mor-
bidity and Mortality among Iraqi Children from 1990 through 1998 (1999), at www.casi.
org.uk
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Extremely deadly, protracted campaigns in bipartisan pursuit of Amer-
ican power have also been the fate of every other region in the developing
world. This destruction reflects a strong and enduring tendency of Ameri-
can institutions, powers, and interests to produce conduct promoting U.S.
power, unconstrained by the severe costs to the inhabitants of developing
countries.
However powerfully they are affected by U.S. foreign policy, foreigners
do not get to vote in American elections. They influence the opinions of
only a tiny minority of those who do.
Economic elites in the United States now vitally depend on American
world power for the growth and independence of their firms. They provide
cadres and interpersonal networks of information and influence essential
to the government function.
The political elites of the United States are no more inclined than the
political elites of any great power to accept its weakening: the strength of
this power seems to be part of their own vitality and dominates their delib-
erations over foreign policy. In these deliberations, the deaths of foreigners
in developing countries seem to have no force in inhibiting the pursuit of
this goal. In the 2899 closely printed pages of the published version of The
Pentagon Papers, our widest window into American foreign policy making,
the detailed, deeply argued and contentious memoranda, records of delib-
erations, internal policy statements and rationales, and erudite narratives
of decisionmaking never once mention the deaths of Vietnamese as an
independent reason to choose a less lethal option.
In the public political culture of the United States, the doctrine that
what strengthens American world power is good is the common property
of both political parties and the presupposition of American schooling and
the mass media. This milieu reflects not just elite interests but a long cul-
tural history and a general tendency to gain a sense of vitality from collec-
tive success in national goals enthusiastically pursued.
Empires always face challenges, in the face of which the mobilization
of destructive power is necessary. The challenges currently faced by the
American empire include the growth of the European Union to a point that
threatens American economic prerogatives; the growth of the major devel-
oping countries, especially China, India, and Brazil, to a point that threat-
ens American governance of the course of globalization; Europe and
Japan's technological peeminence in manufacturing and information-
processing; and the threat posed by declining North American and Saudi
oil reserves and sky-rocketing Chinese consumption to the stable, reasona-
bly cheap access to oil that has been the keystone of American energy pol-
icy. Since America's only qualitative superiority is now military, and
threats and destruction based on this power are a means of advantageous
influence which help to meet these competitive challenges, the use of mili-
tary power is part of any rational response.
It would be good for humanity to tame the outcome of the normal
interactions of elites and the electorate in response to these challenges. For
vast immoral excess is to be expected. But global institutional reforms will,
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if anything, encourage more harmful dominance. A familiar, "realist" view
of international relations would, at this point, insist that nothing useful
can be done except to advise on shrewd uses of power, avoiding pointless
destruction. But the record of decisionmaking shows that this familiar out-
look is blind to a reality of power: social movements outside of institution-
ally-supported processes have helped humanity and curbed imperial
excesses, above all by threatening to reduce their perceived legitimacy, a
vital resource for those in power.
In the Vietnam era, this was the fear that led to a much less lethal path
at each of the great crossroads, beginning with the meeting of Johnson's
Senior Advisory Group that set the course toward deescalation. What the
so-called Wise Men feared was not military defeat, in George Ball's
account, but demoralization, what he later described, in mournful retro-
spection, as "the poisoning of the minds of some Americans toward their
own government. '23 In The Pentagon Papers, public outrage ranks with the
provocation of Chinese or Russian intervention as one of the few reasons
not to kill lots more Vietnamese in pursuit of victory.24
V. Improving a Social Movement
Rather than investing energy in advice on global institutional reform
that will do harm if it goes anywhere, those who seek to improve global
governance should join in a discussion of the best form for a social move-
ment that reduces the harms of current institutionalized powers. Of
course, there is already a movement, or rather a cluster of movements, seek-
ing to reduce these harms. Made possible by the globalization whose
excesses it opposes, it comprises an international bunch of people who
bash Bush, have opposed the Iraq War and occupation, seek to relieve the
inequities and burdens of globalization, call for more action on global cli-
mate change, or are concerned that what governments do to relieve global
poverty is too little or the wrong sort of thing. They have no overarching
organization and, indeed, rarely take an organization as the main vehicle of
their aspirations. More loosely tied, they regard one another as allies, wish
each others' causes well, usually invest energy in more than one cause,
engage in organized activities (sometimes with striking international coor-
dination), and share information-sources of some influence outside the
movement, located in the cosmopolis of the internet.
Here are some suggestions for improving global governance by
strengthening this movement. They presuppose the view of U.S. foreign
policy that I have sketched, while confronting urgent questions that it
leaves open.
First, the unifying aspiration of this movement should not be a wish
that the American empire end now. "The American empire" is an apt label
23. GEORGE BALL, THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN 409, 433 (1982).
24. See generally PENTAGON PAPERS: THE SENATOR GRAVEL EDITION: THE DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT HISTORY OF UNITED STATES DECISIONMAKING ON VIETNAM (BEACON PRESS
1971).
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for the network of domineering influence due to the prerogatives, threat-
influence, and exercise of destructive power of the United States. Although
reducing the excesses of the American empire is an urgent task of the
global social movement, the disappearance of the empire now risks insta-
bility and violence that would exacerbate the burdens of the poor and vul-
nerable. The world's poor need a stable framework for export-driven
growth. The sudden disappearance of the counter-weight to a rising China
would destablize Taiwan and Southeast Asia while promoting a global
hegemony that promises no advantage over the current power structure.
Inevitably, regardless of what social movements or superpowers do,
the world power structure will shift, as a result of technological, economic
and political processes that are not affected by sound moral advice. If the
shift gives rise to a more equitable power structure, a new era, ripe for
institutional reforms, may begin. The current significance of this future
stage is not as a future kitchen for which institutional recipes should now
be written, but as the object of an inspiring vision of a global civic and
political life based on trust and respect, rather than fear and bullying.
Meanwhile, social movements in the interest of humanity work at the mar-
gins, hemming in excesses of the American empire and promoting better
versions of the inevitable shift in power.
Second, even though the end of the American empire should not be
the unifying wish of the global movement, this project of hemming in the
excesses of the empire should be promoted as the unifying theme, promi-
nent in each individual cause. This is not because the American empire is
uniquely evil, but because it is uniquely broad in scope and range: exercis-
ing domineering influence in every region and on every topic of urgent
interest to humanity, the United States is preeminent in inhibiting progress
as it responds to urgent challenges to its power. Efforts to cope with global
climate change are stymied by American fears of concessions to the energy
requirements of large developing countries; efforts to reduce international
violence confront American use of its military force and the forces of its
clients to contain challenges to American wealth and power; protests
against the inequities of globalization confront bullying in which the
United States and its allies seek to exploit bargaining weakness in develop-
ing countries; attempts to cope with world poverty are troubled by manipu-
lative uses of foreign aid by the United States and by its reluctance to
facilitate self-reliant escapes from poverty by trade and finance reforms
that curb U.S. power.
Third, while the decisions that ultimately give effect to this movement
will, primarily, be decisions of national governments, the power of this
movement will be enhanced if the felt affiliations of adherents are interna-
tional. Among those living in the United States, a global attachment to the
global movement is a crucial antidote to loneliness and directs attention to
foreign insight as well as foreign suffering. Among people in developing
countries, attachment to a global movement would help to keep local elites
from using resentment against foreign domination to obscure their inde-
pendent negligence and predation. In general, global attachment within the
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movement keeps alive the inspiring vision of global civic friendship with-
out diverting it into the dead end of global institutional reform.
In this movement, the prospects for good work within institutions are
not by any means to be dismissed. To be effective, the disorderly pressure
of social movements must be recognized as a strong strategic consideration
in the high circles of imperial foreign-policy-making, an outcome that often
depends on the advocacy of insiders. Also, short of global institutional
change, new agreements on specific issues and regional institutional devel-
opments (for example, the advent and expansion of the European Union
and the growing peacekeeping role of the African Union) can offer both
relief from current suffering and provide models and first steps for a later
stage of productive global institutional reform.
However (my final proposal), there is one way in which the global
movement would be more effective if it were more subversive of normal
politics than it is now. Normal politics in every developed country, includ-
ing the politics of outraged protest, is now patriotic. Still, in the United
States (and, very likely, some other countries), those who take part in the
global movement in full awareness of what has been done by their govern-
ment, what will be done, and why will find patriotism a moral burden.
They should cast it aside unless the personal cost is intolerable, and
encourage others to do so on the basis of this patriotism-undermining
knowledge.
By "patriotism," I mean what everyone-except a few philosophers-
means: not just recognition of special responsibilities to compatriots but
also love of country. (I recognize special responsibilities to my classes but
also I do not love them.) To love someone or something is to be lovingly
engrossed with what is characteristic of the beloved. One is drawn to being
preoccupied with the well-being of the beloved. One identifies with the
beloved's success in life as part of one's own success. Because one opens
one's self to the beloved, a self-respecting person has to think -or, in any
case, be powerfully drawn to thinking- that the beloved is (really, if fully
appreciated) worthy of love: misdeeds that betray love are departures from
the beloved's true nature.
Thus, while an American patriot can certainly count the death of for-
eigners as a severe cost and strong dissuasive reason, her patriotism draws
her toward preoccupation with American deaths. For example, she is spon-
taneously drawn to great relief at the very low mortality among U.S. troops
in the invasion overthrowing Saddam Hussein (138 in all, 109 in combat)
and not to anxious inquiries as to the Iraqi costs (about 10,000 deaths, half
civilian.)2 5 Patriotic Americans who agree that vast immoral imperial
excess has been part of America's presence in the world still believe (or are
25. Table of Military Deaths in Iraq, REUTERS, Apr. 7, 2004. The civilian figure is
based on Iraq Body Count's tabulation of reports in major news sources. The Associated
Press Baghdad Bureau reported a "fragmentary" count of 3,240 civilian deaths in the
war, based on deaths recorded in 60 of Iraq's 124 hospitals and excluding records that
did not distinguish between civilian and military deaths, a precaution that they took to
exclude "possibly thousands" of civilian victims. See Niko Price, AP Tallies 3,240 Civilian
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strongly drawn to believe) that the most vivid, present imperial excesses
depart from America's underlying tendencies, hijacking a basically sensi-
ble and humane disposition. An American patriot is drawn to using Ameri-
can political institutions, above all, electoral competition, as her basic
means of restoring the moral well-being of the country she loves. Acknowl-
edging the incapacity of this system to eliminate vast immoral excesses
would make it hard to maintain the view that imperial excess departs from
the true nature of the United States.
A love that must constantly be nursed along with amnesia, wishful
thinking, and inattention to morally urgent interests is not steadfast and
deep but stultifying. In the face of an enduring foreign policy establish-
ment that is steadfast in its pursuit of American power, amnesia, wishful
thinking, and inattention guarantee that opposition congeals only after
great damage is done. If the view of American foreign policy that I have
sketched is right, Americans who develop an informed attachment to the
global movement should see this attachment not as a mere supplement to
patriotism but as a replacement for a stultifying patriotism. A fulfilling and
informed American patriotism, like global institutional reform, is right for
a future stage of global power.
Deaths in Iraq, Associated Press June 11, 2003, available at www.rr.com/v5/my/news/
story/0,250,900_430693,00.html.
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